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ment on the pleadings, claiming there was a failure to state a cause
of action. The trial court sustained the motion and plaintiff appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed. An employer may not recover damages
from a tort-feasor for loss of services of an employee caused by mere
negligence. An employee can only maintain such an action when it
is shown the injuries were intentionally inflicted. Nemo Foundations,
Inc. v. New River Co., 181 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1971).
The court noted that recovery by the master for injury to the
servant, the husband for loss of a wife, and the father for loss of
service of a child are all the results of a particular social status involved. The employer-employee relationship, based on contract, has
no such special relationship; thus the ordinary rules of tort law apply.
The damages to the employer are too remote and indirect for plaintiff to prove the necessary element of proximate cause. As to the
element of foreseeability, the court held the tort-feasor could not
foresee injury to the employer as a consequence of his negligence.
For the above reasons, the court agreed that recovery may be had
only when the injury is intentionally calculated to harm the employee.
Crab OrchardImprovement Co. v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry., 115 F.2d
277 (4th Cir. 1940). It is generally agreed that one party to a contract should not be allowed to recover from a tort-feasor for negligent injuries inflicted on the other party to the contract. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946).
Plaintiff relied on Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86
W. Va. 561, 103 S.E. 923 (1920), which held that an employer
could recover damages for wrongful injuries to his servant resulting
in loss of services to the employer. In Chidester, however, the injury
was the result of an intentional assault and battery occuring during
the employee's course of employment. The consequences of the act
to the employer could easily be foreseen, and thus the cases are distinguishable. The court expressly disapproved language in the Chidester case and held the tort-feasor, under the facts in Nemo Foundations, Inc., owed no legal duty to the employer.

Evidence-Breathalyser Test-Proper Foundation
for Admissibility into Evidence
The defendant was arrested by -a municipal police officer for
the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. A state police officer administered a Breathalyzer
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test to the defendant. The test, which was not administered at the
direction of the arresting officer, showed 0.13 percent of alcohol
in the blood - sufficient by statute to establish prima facie that the
individual was under the influence of alcohol. At the trial the only
foundation laid for the admissibility of this test was the experience
and training of the state police officer, and the reasonable grounds
for the arrest of the defendant. The court admitted the results of the
test into evidence and the defendant was found guilty. Held: Judgment reversed and verdict set aside. State v. Hood, 184 S.E.2d 334
(W. Va. 1971).
The court held that the state had failed to lay a proper foundation for the admissibility of the Breathalyzer test results. The Implied
Consent Statute [W. VA. CODE, ch. 17C, art. 5A, §1 (Michie Supp.
1971)] establishes that an amount of 0.10 percent of alcohol in the
blood creates prima facie evidence of intoxication. The jury could
have given this evidence great weight; therefore, the court held that
the error in admitting the test results was prejudicial to the defendant.
The court would not accept the state's contention that the evidence
was merely cumulative and not prejudicial.
In reversing this case, the court reaffirmed the requirements of
admitting chemical tests in evidence. The state must not only lay a
proper evidentiary foundation, but also must fulfill the statutory requirements in administering the tests.
As to the evidentiary matters, the state did not show that the
equipment used in the test was in proper working order (a basic requirement for the admissibility of any scientific test). The court
also stressed an additional item peculiar to the Breathalyzer test. The
defendant should be observed for at least fifteen minutes prior to the
test to insure that he does not take any food, drink, or other substance in his mouth. A foreign substance in the mouth will destroy
the validity of the test.
In considering the statutory requirements, the court held that
the state had failed to show three of the four basic requirements set
out by statute for the admissibility of these tests. In interpreting the
Implied Consent Statute, the court held that the West Virginia Code,
required the state to show the test was incidental to a lawful arrest
by a law enforcement officer; that it was administered at the direction
of the arresting officer; and that the law enforcement officer was:
(a) a member of the department of public safety; (b) any sheriff
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or deputy sheriff of any county; or (c) a member of a municipal
police department under civil service.
Also the court stated that the West Virginia Code, [ech. 17C,
art. 5A, §5 (Michie Supp. 1971)] required that the test be performed in accordance with methods and standards approved by the
State Department of Health.
The state did show that the test was given incident to a lawful
arrest. However, there was no showing that the test was administered
at the direction of the arresting officer. Nor did the state show that
the municipal police force was under civil service. The state also did
not show that the test was administered according to methods approved by the State Department of Health. This the court said must be
shown before the evidence can be admitted. However the State Department of Health, as of this writing, has not formulated any methods and standards by which the test could be administered. Until these
standards are issued the Breathalyzer test would appear to be incompetent evidence in a West Virginia courtroom.

Torts--Liability Imposed on General Contractor
For Independent Contractor's Negligence
Defendant Crown Construction Co., a general contractor, contracted with the Kent Steel Co. to erect the steel framework of buildings for a shopping center. As an independent contractor, Kent supplied all materials, personnel, and supervision required to accomplish
its portion of the project. A power crane, supplied by Kent and used
to handle steel for the project, had slipped two times because of a
defective clutch. The defendant had become aware of the crane's
faulty condition. The plaintiff, Summers, an ironworker employed
by Kent, was severely injured when on a third occasion the crane
dropped a load of steel. Summers sued Crown for negligence in the
federal district court. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Held: judgment affirmed. Evidence proved that Crown had retained
general authority to enforce the safety precautions to be taken by its
independent contractors. The accident resulted in part from a failure
of Crown to exercise this authority to force Kent to have the defective crane fixed, especially after the defendant became aware of its
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